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CRITICAL	NOTICE	Talking	with	Vultures			
Relativism	 and	 Monadic	 Truth,	 by	 Herman	 Cappelen	 and	 John	 Hawthorne.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009.	Pp.	vii	+	170.	H/b	£33.49;	p/b	£18.99			 I		At	 the	 time	 of	 its	 first	 publication,	 relativism	 was	 proclaimed	 by	 the	 publisher’s	advertisement	 for	Herman	Cappelen	 and	 John	Hawthorne’s	 book	 to	 be	 “currently	 the	hottest	topic	in	philosophy”.	Maybe	that	was	commercial	license	but	there	is	no	denying	that	the	debates	provoked	by	the	reinvention	of	relativism	as	a	thesis	not	of	speculative	metaphysics	but	of	descriptive	semantic	theory1	have	been	intense	and	have	attracted	much	attention.	Relativism,	as	understood	in	these	debates,	is	the	claim	that,	for	at	least	certain	distinguished	regions	of	discourse—in	the	recent	literature,	the	relativistic	case	has	 been	 argued	 for	 discourses	 concerning	 each	 of	 epistemic	 mights	 and	 coulds,	knowledge,	 taste,	 indicative	 conditionals,	 probability	 statements,	 and	 future	contingents2—we	 obtain	 the	 best	 theoretical	 characterisation	 of	 our	 actual	 linguistic	practice	by	allowing	that	the	truth	value	of	an	assertion	is	not	determined	purely	by	the	state	of	the	world	in	relevant	respects3	but	depends	upon	and	may	vary	with	additional	parameters	whose	values	may	be	different	across	different	thinkers.	4		 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne’s	 short	 book5	 belongs	 to	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 reaction	against	this	tendency,	and	at	the	time	of	writing	remains	the	only	book-length	critique	of	 it.	 Its	 heart	 is	 a	 systematic	 defence	 of	 a	 cluster	 of	 traditional	 ideas	 that	 together	amount	to	the	thesis	that	 its	authors	caption	as	Simplicity,	 incorporating	the	following	five	ingredient	claims	(p.	1):		
																																																								
1 See, for instance, Egan 2010, 2014; Glanzberg 2007; Kölbel 2004; Lasersohn 2005, 2009; MacFarlane 2014; 
Recanati 2007; Richard 2008; Stephenson 2007. 
2 Relativism about epistemic modals have been defended, among others, by Egan 2007, 2011, Gillies 2010, 
MacFarlane 2014; among the advocates of relativism about knowledge are Brogaard 2008, Kompa 2002, 
MacFarlane 2014, Richard 2004, Stephenson 2007; advocates of relativism about taste include Egan 2010; 
Lasersohn 2005; Kölbel 2004; MacFarlane 2014, Richard 2008; relativism about indicative conditionals is 
discussed by Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010, Weatherson 2009; relativism about probability statement has been 
proposed by Douven 2011; a relativistic treatment of future contingent has been discussed by Belnap, Perloff, 
and Xu 2001, and MacFarlane 2014. 
3 That is, roughly: respects of which mention is made in the assertion. 
4 This formulation deliberately ignores the distinction between the claim that a certain region of discourse is, in 
MacFarlane’s terminology, assessment-sensitive, whereby the truth value of one of its characteristic assertions is 
allowed to vary with aspects of the context of an assessor, and the thesis—dubbed by MacFarlane non-indexical 
contextualism—whereby tokens of the same type-assertion are allowed to vary in truth-value with aspects of the 
context of their assertor and without concomitant variation in content. This distinction is of great importance 
when it comes to predicting patterns of correction and retraction, on which MacFarlane's own strategy of 
argument for relativism is primarily based. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Cappelen and Hawthorne make little 
of it. We shall not be preoccupied with it here. 
5 All page references are to this text unless otherwise stated. 
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T1)	There	are	propositions6	and	they	instantiate	the	fundamental	monadic	properties	of	truth	simpliciter	and	falsity	simpliciter.	T2)	The	semantic	values	of	declarative	sentences	relative	 to	contexts	of	utterance	are	propositions.	T3)	 Propositions	 are,	 unsurprisingly,	 the	 objects	 of	 propositional	 attitudes,	 such	 as	belief,	hope,	wish,	doubt,	etc.	T4)	Propositions	are	the	objects	of	illocutionary	acts;	they	are,	e.g.,	what	we	assert	and	deny.	T5)	Propositions	are	the	objects	of	agreement	and	disagreement.	It	is	immediately	striking	that	no	relativist	need	want	to	demur	at	any	of	T2–T5.	Indeed,	of	 these	 four	 theses,	 only	 the	 last	 is	 worthy	 of	 comment	 at	 this	 point.	 T5	 is	 open	 to	weaker	and	stronger	interpretations.	 	Weakly	interpreted,	 it	says	that	any	proposition	can	be	a	focus	of	agreement	and	disagreement:	propositions,	understood	as	per	T3	and	T4,	 are	 things	 whose	 truth-values	 thinkers	 can	 agree	 or	 disagree	 about.	 No	 big	 deal	there.	 But	 under	 a	 stronger	 interpretation,	 T5	 says	 that	 any	 genuine	agreement/disagreement	 involves	 conflicting	 attitudes	 to	 some	 single	 proposition	 in	the	 sense	 of	 “proposition”	 determined	 by	 the	 other	 clauses:	 that	 genuine	agreement/disagreement	 requires	 convergent/conflicting	 attitudes	 to	 some	 such	propositional	 content	 shared	 between	 the	 protagonists.	 Of	 course,	 we	 customarily	invoke	the	notions	of	agreement	and	disagreement	in	ways	that	relax	that—as	when	we	describe	people	as	agreeing	or	disagreeing	about	what	they	want	or	what	to	do.7	Still,	there	is	a	core	notion	of	agreement/disagreement	for	which	T5	is	correct.	And	this	is	a	crucial	point	in	relativistic	thinking,	which	draws	motivation	from	the	thought	that	it	is	this	 notion	 that	 is	 in	 play	 in	 e.g.	 many	 disagreements	 about	 taste	 or	 value.	 If	 dining	together	 in	 a	 Japanese	 restaurant,	 the	 situation	 when	 Greta	 opines	 that	 the	 sushi	 is	delicious	 and	 Elisabeth	 that	 it	 is	 actually	 rather	 bland	 and	 slimy	 is	 to	 be	 captured	 in	terms	of	 the	notion	of	disagreement	pointed	at	by	T5	under	 its	 strong	 interpretation,	then	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 proposition—presumably:	 <this	 sushi	 is	 delicious>—that	provides	 the	 focus	of	 the	disagreement.	And	once	 that	 is	 granted,	 there	 is	no	ducking	awkward	 metaphysical	 questions	 about	 the	 truth-conditions	 of	 that	 proposition,	 to	which	 relativism	 gives	 the	 answer	 that	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 are	 keen	 to	 avoid.	Hence	 the	 general	 tendency	 of	 their	 argument	 in	 this	 book:	 to	 propose	 a	 semantic	contextualism	that	enables	 them	deny	that,	 in	general,	such	 ‘disagreements’	genuinely	count	as	such	under	 the	aegis	of	T5.8	Rather,	 there	 is	 in	such	cases	only	an	 illusion	of	disagreement;	there	is,	in	the	Japanese	restaurant	scenario,	no	single	proposition	that	is	respectively	affirmed	by	Greta	and	rejected	by	Elisabeth.		 Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 the	 point	 of	 collision	 between	 relativism	 and	 Simplicity	 that	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	intend	has	to	be	found	in	T1.	However	the	formulation	above	does	not	seem	to	be	the	most	felicitous	possible	for	their	purposes.	For	one	thing,	it	is	strange	 to	 read	 of	 ordinary,	 non-relativistic	 truth—the	 (non-deflationary)	 notion	 of	truth	that	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	surely	intend	Simplicity	to	evoke	in	their	readers—as	characterised	as	a	monadic	property.	Truth,	so	intuitively	understood,	is	a	relational	property:	 a	property	 conferred	on	a	proposition	by	 the	 state	of	 the	world	 in	 relevant	respects.	 Relativism	 parts	 company	 with	 truth	 so	 understood	 not	 in	 regarding	 it	 as																																																									
6 Cappelen and Hawthorne espouse no particular theory of the nature of propositions. 
7  See, for instance, Gibbard 2003, Huvenes 2012, 2014, MacFarlane 2014.  
8 They do allow, though, that certain such apparent disagreements are genuine. We’ll come to this below. 
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relational	but	in	raising	the	degree	of	the	relation	one	level:	from	a	dyadic	property	to	a	triadic	one—a	relation	between	a	proposition,	a	circumstance	of	evaluation	and	‘context	of	 assessment’	 or	 ‘perspective’.	 	 But	 more	 importantly,	 as	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	themselves	point	out,	relativists	have	no	trouble	introducing	a	monadic	truth	predicate,	or	 predicate	 of	 disquotation,	 and	 an	 associated	 truth	 operator,9	 and	 can	 accordingly	agree	 that	 propositions	 lie	 within	 its	 range,	 and	 so	 buy	 into	 the	 letter	 of	 T1	 to	 that	extent.	The	crucial	point	about	T1	is	thus	its	inclusion	of	the	word	‘fundamental’:	for	the	relativist,	when	in	a	particular	context	a	proposition	is	correctly	characterised	simply	as	“true”,	 the	 characterisation	 will	 mask	 the	 triadic	 complexity	 just	 noted.	 At	 the	
fundamental	 level,	 the	 level	 at	 which	 the	 triadic	 relationship	 obtains,	 no	 property	 of	truth	 simpliciter,	 as	 Cappelen	 and	Hawthorne	 like	 to	 say,	 is	 to	 be	 found—or	 at	 least,	none	that	applies	to	that	proposition.			 So,	 there	 are	 issues	 about	 what	 exactly	 is	 the	 happiest	 formulation	 of	 T1	 for	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne’s	purposes.	But	maybe	its	spirit	is	clear	enough.	It	had	better	be,	 for	 perhaps	 their	 most	 important	 project	 in	 Relativism	 and	 Monadic	 Truth	 is	 to	illustrate	 how	 to	 bring	 within	 the	 sanctuary	 of	 T1	 those	 areas	 of	 our	 talk	 that	 have	encouraged	 the,	 in	 their	 view,	 misguided	 tendency	 to	 relativism.	 The	 discussion	proceeds	through	four	chapters.	Chapter	1	provides	an	overview	of	the	recent	debates,	of	the	key	moves	and	terms	of	art	they	have	generated,	and	an	account	of	the	roots	of	relativism	 as	 a	 style	 of	 systematic	 semantic	 theory	 in	 the	 earlier	work	 of	 Lewis	 and,	especially,	 Kaplan	 on	 the	 semantics	 of	 indexicals.10	 Chapter	 2	 focuses	 on	 the	 crucial	question	 of	 shared	 content,	 and	 proposes	 the	 agreement-based	 diagnostic	 for	 it	 that	structures	 the	 core	 arguments	 of	 the	 book.	 Chapter	 3	 is	 a	 critique	 in	 depth	 of	 the	semantic	 and	metaphysical	motivations	 for	 the	kind	of	 (anti-Simplicity)	 conception	of	propositional	content	that	informs	Lewis’s	and	Kaplan’s	respective	treatments	of	tensed	discourse	and	their	introduction	of	the	idea	of	a	temporally	neutral	proposition	(the	so-called	Operator	Argument)	which	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	identify	as	the	root	of,	and	core	mistake	in,	the	modern	movement	to	relativism.	Chapter	4,	finally,	on	predicates	of	personal	 taste,	 attempts	 to	 show	 how	 (a	 sophisticated)	 contextualism,	 backed	 by	 the	agreement-based	conception	of	shared	content,	 can	provide	a	satisfying	account,	 in	at	least	this	one	area.	This,	in	turn,	is	taken	to	show	how	relativism	can	be	avoided	and	T1	saved	 consistently	with	 recognition	of	 the	 role	 of	 subjectivity	 in	 our	 talk	 of	 taste	 and	avoidance	 of	 an	 extreme	 and	 incredible	 realism	 about	 the	 subject	matter.	 Relativism,	they	 contend,	 is	 thus	 unmotivated	 even	 in	 what	 might	 be	 considered,	 lay-philosophically,	 the	most	 promising-looking	 area	 for	 it.	 In	 addition,	 so	 Cappelen	 and	Hawthorne	 argue,	 relativism	 here	 encounters	 serious	 difficulties	 with,	 for	 example,	‘bound’	 uses	 (e.g.	 “Everyone	 at	 the	 party	 will	 find	 something	 fun	 to	 do”)	 and	embeddings	of	relativist	contents	in	factive	attitudinal	verbs.		 This	 is	 a	 large	 sweep	 of	 ground,	 covered	 in	 a	 brisk,	 adversarial	 but	 good-humoured	 style,	 in	 a	 short	 book	 full	 of	 interesting	 ideas	 and	 arguments.	 In	 the	discussion	to	follow,	perforce	highly	selective,	we	mainly	concentrate	on	its	treatment	of	 discourse	 concerning	 personal	 taste.	 To	 come	 clean,	 our	 sympathies	 are	with	 two	principal	claims:	first,	that	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	do	not	actually	succeed	in	making	out	 a	 form	 of	 contextualism	 adequate	 to	 discourse	 of	 basic	 taste;	 second,	 that	contextualism	is	anyway	an	unmotivated	direction	for	this	particular	area—that	a	much	more	 promising	 model	 is	 provided	 by	 minimalist	 conceptions	 of	 truth	 and	 truth-																																																								
9 See pp.12-14 and 134-37. The point is emphasised by MacFarlane in his 2014 at pp.93-94. 
10 See especially Kaplan 1989 and Lewis 1980. 
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aptitude.11	 A	 plague,	 in	 short,	 at	 least	 for	 basic	 taste,	 on	 both	 the	 relativist	 and	contextualist	houses.	 	II	Why,	 or	when	 should	 anyone	 be	 drawn	 to	 relativism	 about	 some	 discourse?	 In	 John	McFarlane's	work	on	epistemic	modals,	it	is	certain	putative	patterns	of	correction	and	retraction	 in	 our	 talk	 involving	 epistemic	 ‘mights’	 that	 provides	 the	 primary	motivation.12	With	predications	of	taste,	however,	matters	are	different.	Consider	again	the	Japanese	restaurant	example:			Greta:	This	sushi	is	delicious.13	Elisabeth:	 I	 don’t	 know	how	 you	 can	 say	 that.	 It	 is	 not	 in	 the	 slightest	 delicious—it’s	insipid.		Why	might	reflection	on	the	kind	of	contretemps	illustrated	by	this	exchange	encourage	relativism?	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 (p.	 101)	 identify	 the	 core	motivation	 as	 that	 of	avoiding	 a	 kind	 of	 chauvinism.	 Imagining	 us	 in	 dispute	 with	 a	 talking	 vulture	 who	provocatively	affirms	that,	“Rotting	flesh	is	fabulous;	there	is	nothing	disgusting	about	it	at	all”,14	they	write		.	.	.even	once	it	is	conceded	that	there	is	a	common	content	to	“Rotting	flesh	is	disgusting”	in	the	mouths	of	humans	and	talking	vultures,	that	does	not	yet	vindicate	relativism.	But,	assuming	that	we	have	reason	to	play	the	game	of	broadly	truth-conditional	semantics	as	opposed	to	expressivism,	there	is	now	some	motivation	for	relativism.	After	all,	 it	seems	very	 intuitive	 to	 think	 that	 there	 is	 symmetry	 between	 our	 situation	 and	 the	 vulture’s.	There	 would	 be	 something	 bizarrely	 chauvinistic	 about	 claiming	 the	 vulture	 is	 wrong,	we're	right,	and	leave	it	at	that.	And	it	would	impress	as	similarly	bigoted	or	arrogant	if	Elisabeth,	or	Greta,	were	to	flat-out	 insist,	without	 further	ado,	on	 the	correctness	of	her	 rating	of	 the	sushi.	 Still,	 this	diagnosis	is	not	quite	right.	The	avoidance	of	chauvinism	is	at	one	remove	from	the	real	springs	of	relativist	motivation	here.	Chauvinism/bigotry	of	that	kind	presumes	a	fact	of	
the	matter—something	for	one	to	be	right	about	and	the	vulture/other	guy	to	be	wrong.	And	if	there	is	such	a	fact	of	the	matter,	philosophy	now	demands	some	kind	of	account	of	its	nature,	and	of	its	epistemology—of	what	it	takes	to	be	sensitive	to	it	and	of	why	one	 might	 reasonably	 take	 it	 that	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 one	 is	 so	 sensitive	 and	 the	vulture/other	 guy	wrong.	 So	 the	 pressure,	 ultimately,	 is	 philosophical,	 not	moral.	 To	anyone	who	lacks,	any	clear	idea	of	how	such	a	philosophical	story	might	plausibly	run,	the	 attraction	of	 relativism	 is	 that	 it	 allows	one	 to	 respect	 the	 appearance	of	 genuine	disagreement	 in	 the	 examples,	 but	 without	 thereby	 incurring	 a	 commitment	 to																																																									
11 Reference omitted. 
12 MacFarlane 2011, 2014 (Chapter 10). 
13 Cappelen and Hawthorne castigate a tendency they find in the literature to focus on generic examples like 
“Sushi is delicious”, “Stewed rhubarb is disgusting”, “Roller coasters are fun”, and so on, suspecting that the 
well-known vagaries of generics are apt to somehow skew our intuitions about them—see, in particular, p.113. 
It seems to us open to question whether or why that should be so, but in deference to their concern we will for 
the most part steer clear of such examples here. However see n. 28 below. 
14 The narrative of Relativism and Monadic Truth is punctuated with such phantasmagoric examples involving 
dialogue with a variety of talking animals such as vultures (pp.100-1), cats (p.113) and rats (p.120).  As the 
authors seem to realise (p.116), the reader may feel some methodological unease at this, but we will not make 
anything of it here. 
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regarding	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 antagonists	 as	 mistaken	 about	 the	 real	 fact;	 rather	we/Elisabeth	can	be	judging	correctly	in	the	light	of	our/her	gustatory	sensibilities,	and	the	 vulture/Greta	 correctly	 in	 the	 light	 of	 hers,	 and	 there	 need	 be	 nothing	 to	 choose	between	the	two	sensibilities.	So	the	case	can	be	one	of	'faultless'	disagreement:	neither	judgement	 need	 be	 out	 of	 kilter	 with	 the	 facts;	 neither	 judgement	 need	 be	inappropriately	arrived	at.			 Thus	the	 impetus	to	relativism	in	the	area	of	 taste,	we	suggest,	 is	a	resolution	of	the	 forces	 exerted	by	 three	 ingredient,	 individually	 attractive,	 assumptions:	 a	broadly	truth-conditional	 conception	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 claims	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 kind	 of	prima	 facie	 disagreement	 illustrated;	 an	 acceptance	 that	 such	 a	 prima	 facie	disagreement	is	a	genuine	disagreement	in	the	sense	of	T5,	strongly	interpreted;	and	a	rejection	of	 the	 idea	 that	 the	world	bestows	determinate	 truth-values	on	 the	contents	thereby	 in	 dispute.	 Expressivism	drops	 the	 first	 assumption;	 contextualism	drops	 the	second;	 (naïve,	 or	 rampant)	 realism	 the	 third.	 But	 relativism	 allows	 us	 to	 accept	 all	three.		 III		A	 stock	 anti-contextualist	 complaint	 is	 indeed	 the	 charge	 of	 lost	 disagreement:	 that	contextualism	comes	at	the	cost	of	misconceivedly	compatibilising	the	conflicting	claims	in	 examples	 such	 as	 this.	 But	 how	might	 a	 relativist	 (or	 anyone)	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 a	disagreement	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 T5,	 involving	 shared	 content	 and	 genuinely	 conflicting	claims	expressed	in	terms	of	it?	And	how	should	a	contextualist	argue,	to	the	contrary,	that	 there	 is	no	such	shared	content,	 that	 there	 is	 context-sensitivity	 in	 the	predicate,	“delicious”,	which	prevents	 it?	This	 is	 the	central	 issue	 for	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne’s	Chapter	2.		 One	simple	and	sensible-seeming	first	 thought	 is	 that	 the	context-insensitivity	of	an	 expression	 shows	 in	 its	 amenability	 to	 accurate	 homophonic	 speech	 reporting.	Certainly,	 core	 indexicals—personal	 pronouns,	 tenses,	 demonstratives—are	 not	generally	 so	 amenable.	 If	 someone	 says,	 “I	 feel	 tired”,	 or	 “It	 is	 raining	 today”,	 for	example,	another,	or	someone	at	a	later	date,	cannot	accurately	report	what	was	said	by	using	the	very	same	form	of	words.	More	generally:	if	an	expression	is	context-sensitive,	there	will	be	aspects	of	a	context	of	its	use,	c1,	variation	in	which	will	cause	its	semantic	contribution	to	vary;	so	then,	one	might	expect,	a	report	made	in	a	different	context,	c2,	differing	 in	 relevant	 such	aspects,	 of	what	was	 said	by	 the	expression’s	use	 in	 c1	will	have	to	use	a	different	expression	in	order	to	preserve	the	appropriate	truth-conditions.			 This	 simple	 and	 sensible-seeming	 thought	 fails.	 As	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	illustrate,	there	are	just	too	many	counterexamples:	expressions	whose	semantic	values	are	unquestionably	 sensitive	 to	 certain	 aspects	of	 a	 context	of	use	but	 are	 standardly	available	 for	 homophonic	 speech	 reporting	 even	 in	 contexts	 differing	 in	 just	 those	aspects.	The	reference	of	uses	of	“nearby”,	for	example,	is	sensitive	to	the	location	of	the	speaker.	 But	 if	 in	 a	 transatlantic	 phone	 conversation	 someone	 says,	 “There	 is	 an	excellent	Japanese	restaurant	nearby”,	her	conversant,	quizzed	about	what	she	said,	can	perfectly	 properly	 reply,	 “She	 said	 that	 there	 is	 an	 excellent	 Japanese	 restaurant	nearby.”	 	 Similarly	 for	 “local”,	 “left”	 and	 “right”,	 “overhead”,	 “future”	 and	 so	 on.	 The	phenomenon	is	one	of	what	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	call	parasitic	context-sensitivity	whereby	 a	 reporter	 of	 an	 utterance	 defers	 to	 features	 of	 the	 context	 of	 the	 reportee,	rather	 than	 their	 own,	 to	 fix	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 context-sensitive	 expression.	 It	 is	widespread,	 and	 it	 blocks	 any	 fast	 track	 argument	 for	 the	 context-insensitivity	 of	
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“delicious”,	e.g.,	from	the	fact	that	one	can	smoothly	report	that	Greta	affirmed	that	the	sushi	was	delicious	and	that	Elisabeth	affirmed	that	it	was	not	in	the	slightest.		 Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	review	a	refinement	of	the	simple	thought	proposed	in	their	own	earlier	work.15	The	basic	idea	is	that	parasitic	context-sensitivity	is	incapable	of	explaining	possibilities	of	smooth	collective	 speech	reports,	whereby	 if	a	number	of	speakers,	 Mary	 and	 John	 and	 Fred	 .	 .	 ,	 all	 affirm	 a	 sentence	 S,	 they	 may—always?,	usually?—felicitously	 be	 reported	 by:	 “Mary	 and	 John	 and	 Fred	 all	 said	 that	 S”.	 For,	assuming	 S	 were	 context-sensitive,	 and	 that	 relevant	 features	 of	 context	 would	 (be	likely	to)	vary	across	Mary’s,	John’s,	Fred’s,	etc.,	respective	utterances,	to	whose	context	of	use	would	the	semantic	value	of	S	as	used	in	the	collective	report	be	answerable?	As	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	nicely	express	the	matter,	a	parasite	can	only	feed	off	one	host	at	a	time!	But	while	that	is	true,	“nearby”	and	its	ilk	seem	to	submit	to	smooth	collective	reporting	 too.	 If	 in	 a	 three-way	 Skype	 conversation,	 John,	 in	 his	 office	 on	 the	 USC	campus,	affirms	“There	is	an	excellent	Japanese	restaurant	nearby”	and	Herman,	in	Oslo,	affirms	 the	 very	 same	 words,	 Jason	 can	 perfectly	 felicitously	 report:	 “They	 are	 both	saying	that	there	is	an	excellent	 Japanese	restaurant	nearby.”16	The	explanation	of	the	felicity,	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 plausibly	 contend,	 draws	 on	 essentially	 analogous	resources	to	those	needed	to	disambiguate	the	two	salient	readings	of:			 Herman	loves	his	partner	and	so	does	John.	Under	the	reading	relevant	here,	the	property	ascribed	to	both	Herman	and	John	is:			 	.	.	is	an	x	such	that	some	y	is	uniquely	the	partner	of	x	and	x	loves	y.	17	Following	that	model,	the	property	ascribed	by	Jason	to	both	John	and	Herman	may	be	rendered	as:			 .	 .	 is	 an	 x	 such	 that	 x	 said	 that	 there	 is	 an	 excellent	 Japanese	 restaurant	near	 to		 where	x	is.	The	 felicity	 of	 the	 collective	 report	 is	 thus	 perfectly	 consistent	 with	 the	 context-sensitivity	of	“nearby”.18		 How	 then,	 in	 a	 controversial	 case,	 should	 battle	 between	 a	 contextualist	 and	 an	invariantist	(of	whatever	stripe)	be	joined?	In	the	second	part	of	the	chapter,	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	 introduce	 a	 new	 range	 of	 diagnostics	 for	 sameness	 and	 difference	 of	content,	 based	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 “agree”	 and	 “disagree”.	 Their	 key	 thought	 is	 that	while,	in	the	above	example,	Jason's	report	that	both	John	and	Herman	are	saying	that	there	is	an	excellent	Japanese	restaurant	nearby	is	felicitous	enough,	it	would	be	quite	inappropriate	for	him	to	report	this	as	an	agreement—to	affirm	that	John	and	Herman	
agree	 that	 there	 is	an	excellent	 Japanese	restaurant	nearby.	The	 felicity	of	 that	 report	would	 require	 that	 John	 and	 Herman	 be	 speaking	 of	 the	 same	 location.	 In	 the	circumstances	 of	 the	 example,	 their	 each	 having	 the	 property,	merely,	 of	 saying	 that	there	 is	 an	 excellent	 Japanese	 restaurant	 in	 their	 own	 locality	 grounds	 a	 point	 of	similarity,	not	of	agreement.			 This	proposal	impresses	as	progress.	Spurred	by	it,	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	put	forward	 (though	 with	 some	 hesitancy	 it	 must	 be	 said)	 three	 specific	 diagnostic	principles	whose	overall	gist,	very	roughly	summarised,	is	as	follows:																																																										
15 See, for instance Cappelen and Lepore 2005 and Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007. 
16 Interestingly there are uses of ‘nearby’ that are not ambiguous and where the ‘distributive’ reading is forced. 
Jason says: “Herman and John are so lucky to have good Japanese restaurants nearby” where it is known that 
there’s no Japanese restaurant near Jason and that Herman and John are in distinct locations. 
17 Contrast: being an x such that some y is uniquely the partner of Herman and x loves y. 
18 In the interests of brevity, we here prescind from Cappelen’s and Hawthorne’s own sophisticated discussion 
of the point and its ramifications on pp. 46-50. 
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Where	sincere	utterances	of	S	and	‘not-S’	cannot	correctly	be	reported	as	expressive	of	 disagreement,	 S	 is	 context-sensitive;	 and	 where	 they	 can,	 that	 is	 evidence	 of	semantic	invariance.		Where	 a	 pair	 of	 sincere	 utterances	 of	 S	 can	 correctly	 be	 reported	 as	 expressive	 of	agreement,	 that	 is	 evidence	 of	 semantic	 invariance;	 and	when	 they	 cannot,	 that	 is	evidence	of	context-sensitivity.	19	As	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	realise	and	discuss,	 there	are	still	points	of	 strain	 in	 this	general	direction	but	we	shall	not	attempt	to	explore	their	proposals	further	here.	What	is	 striking	 for	 present	 purposes	 is	 that	 even	 a	 correct	 capture	 of	 the	 relationship	between	 agreement/disagreement	 and	 context-sensitivity/invariance	 doesn’t	 promise	any	immediate	leverage	on	the	task	in	hand.	The	relativist	is	saying	that,	in	the	Japanese	restaurant	 example,	 Greta	 and	 Elisabeth	 are	 in	 disagreement	 about	 the	 merit	 of	 the	sushi,	that	this	requires	a	shared	propositional	content	which	they	respectively	endorse	and	 reject,	 and	 that	 a	 semantics	 for	 the	 discourse	 in	 question	 should	 therefore	 be	invariantist.	The	contextualist	is	saying	that	“delicious”	is	a	context-sensitive	expression	in	 a	 way	 that	 entails	 that	 Greta’s	 and	 Elisabeth’s	 respective	 assertions	 are	 not	expressive	of	a	genuine	disagreement	but	are	compatible,	and	that	a	semantics	for	the	discourse	 in	 question	 should	 therefore	 spell	 out	 the	 appropriate	 form	 of	 context-sensitivity.	 The	 theorists	 are	 accordingly	 on	 the	 same	 page	 about	 the	 connections	between	disagreement	and	shared	content.	What	is	wanted,	in	order	to	adjudicate	their	dispute,	is	some	independent	grip	on	one	or	other	of	the	intertwined	notions:	some	way,	for	 example,	 not	 going	 via	 the	 question	 of	 shared	 content,	 of	 determining	 whether	genuine	disagreement	 is	 involved,	or	some	way,	not	going	via	 the	question	whether	a	genuine	disagreement	is	involved,	of	determining	whether	there	is	shared	content.			 We	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 are	 unaware	 of	 this.	Nevertheless	 they	 provide,	 it	 must	 be	 said,	 almost	 nothing	 by	 way	 of	 the	 needed	independent	 grip.	 The	 issue	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 only	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 and	 there	 they	 are	content	for	the	most	part	to	make	the	case	for	their	preferred	contextualism	simply	by	appeal	 to	 the	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	 “intuitions	 of	 contradiction”	 or	 our	 “sense”	 of	disagreement	 in	particular	 cases.	 Yet	 these	 “senses”	 and	 “intuitions”	 are	 exactly	what	are	disputed	by	their	relativist	opponents—the	sense	of	“lost	disagreement”	is,	after	all,	presented	as	an	intuitive	datum	that	relativism	urges	we	take	very	seriously.		 To	be	sure,	it	is	not	easy	to	see	how	to	do	better.	But	here	is	one	suggestion.20	If	“S”	contains	 context-sensitive	 expressions,	 then	distinct	 tokens	of	 “S”	 in	different	mouths																																																									
19 So roughly summarised, the proposals invite, to be sure, qualifications and clarifications that Cappelen’s and 
Hawthorne’s more nuanced formulations address. These do not affect the main point in our comments to follow, 
so we decline to review them here. For the benefit of a reader who wishes to think further about Cappelen’s and 
Hawthorne’s proposals, the exact formulations (pp. 54-5) of the three agreement-based diagnostics are these: 
• Agree-1: Let u be a sincere utterance of S by A in C and u′ a sincere utterance of ‘not-S’ by B in C′. If from a 
third context C″ they cannot be correctly reported by ‘A and B disagree whether S’, then S is semantically 
context sensitive. Meanwhile, if from a third context C″ they can be correctly reported by ‘A and B disagree 
whether S’, that is evidence that S is semantically invariant across C, C′, and C″. 
• Agree-2: Take two sincere utterances u and  u′ by A and B of a sentence S in contexts C and C′. If from a third 
context C″ they can be reported by an utterance of ‘A and B agree that S’, then that is evidence that S is 
semantically invariant across C, C′, and C″.  Meanwhile, if the report in C″ is incorrect, that is evidence that S is 
not semantically invariant across C, C′, and C″. 
• Agree-3: Let an A-Triple for a sentence S be a triple consisting of two sincere utterances u and u′ of S by A 
and B respectively in distinct contexts C and C′, and one utterance of ‘A and B agree that S’ in a third context 
C″. If, for all A-triples involving S, the last member is true, then that is evidence that S is semantically invariant. 
20 Reference omitted.  
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may	 have	 different	 truth-conditions.	 So	 distinct	 token	 questions,	 “S?”,	 in	 different	mouths	 may	 have	 different	 conditions	 for	 truthful	 affirmative	 answers.	 Hence	 if	“delicious”	 and	 its	 ilk	 are	 context-sensitive,	 it	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 design	 a	 pair	 of	conversational	contexts	within	which	a	pair	of	tokens	of	the	question,	e.g.,	“Is	the	sushi	here	 really	 as	 delicious	 as	 people	 say?”	 presented	 simultaneously	 to	 a	 single	 agent—maybe	a	waiter—can	respectively	properly	deserve	prima	facie	conflicting	yet	sincere	answers.21			 This	Forked	Tongue	test,	as	we	may	dub	it,	is	pretty	crude—for	instance,	it	won't	distinguish	context-sensitivity	 from	simple	ambiguity.	Still,	 its	credentials	as	at	 least	a	necessary	 condition	 for	 context-sensitivity	 seem	 good.	 Consider	 a	 simple	 illustration.	Suppose	Herman	and	John	have	been	waiting	quite	a	while	 for	a	table	at	the	Japanese	restaurant,	which	is	very	busy,	and	are	wondering	whether	to	duck	out	and	go	and	eat	somewhere	 else.	 The	 head	 waiter	 standing	 nearby	 is	 on	 the	 phone,	 and	 Herman	overhears	 him	 say,	 “Yes,	 sir,	 actually	 there	 is.	 There	 is	 an	 excellent	 Italian	 just	 two	minutes	away	where	they	serve	superb	homemade	pasta	and	seafood	sauces.	You	can	almost	always	get	a	table	without	waiting.”	Herman	says,	“Excuse	me,	but	did	you	say	that	 there	 is	 an	 excellent	 Italian	 restaurant	 just	 two	minutes	 away?”	The	head	waiter	replies,	“Ah.	Actually,	no.	I	mean:	I	did	say	that,	but	I	was	talking	to	one	of	our	regulars	about	another	location	downtown.”			 Thus:	“just	two	minutes	away”	passes	the	test.	It	was	the	context	of	a	question	of	the	regular	customer,	rather	than	Herman’s,	that	set	the	reference	of	“just	two	minutes	away”	in	the	waiter’s	overheard	remark.	When	Herman	puts	a	token	of	essentially	the	same	type-question,	the	reference	shifts	and	the	correct	answer	changes.			 Can	we	get	a	similar	result	with	“delicious”?	Let’s	try	to	construct	an	analogously	shaped	 case,	 but	where	 the	 questioners’	 respective	 contexts	 differ	 in	 respect	 of	 their	standards	 of	 taste.	 We	 need	 to	 presuppose,	 of	 course,	 that	 the	 agent	 questioned	 is	somehow	aware	of	that.	So:	let	Greta	and	Elisabeth	be	seated	in	the	Japanese	restaurant,	yet	to	order,	menus	in	hand,	head-waiter	in	attendance.	Elisabeth	mentions	that	she	has	never	before	tried	sushi	and	asks	the	head-waiter,	“Is	the	sushi	here	really	as	delicious	as	people	say?”	Greta,	a	regular	customer	at	the	restaurant,	is	most	surprised	when	the	waiter	replies,	apparently	completely	seriously,	“No,	ma’am.	It’s	not	delicious	at	all.”	“I	beg	your	pardon”,	Greta	exclaims.	“Why	would	you	say	that?	I	eat	here	often,	as	you	well	know,	 and	 have	 always	 found	 the	 sushi	 excellent.”	 “Indeed	 it	 is,	 madam,”	 the	 waiter	smilingly	explains.	“But	I	was	answering	your	inexperienced	friend.”		 Thick-skinned	 contextualists	may	 find	 this	 dialogue	 unexceptionable.	We	would	suggest,	 to	 the	 contrary,	 that	 the	waiter	 has	 chosen	 a	 very	 strange	 and	 inept	way	 to	convey	to	Elisabeth	that	the	sushi	will	(very	probably)	not	be	to	her	liking.	Why	is	that	if	“delicious”	and	“excellent”	are	sensitive	to	speakers’	standards	of	taste	as	“nearby”	and	“just	two	minutes	away”	are	sensitive	to	speakers’	location?			 																																																										
21 Why simultaneously? Because restaurant standards—ownerships and chefs, e.g.—can change. (We needn’t 
require strict simultaneity though. It will be enough to ensure that the material practices in the kitchen are 
unlikely to have altered within the interval when the two questions are put.) Why a single agent? Because we 
want to ensure that if different answers are appropriate to the distinct token questions, they are so because of 
variations in relevant factors operative in their respective conversational contexts, rather than variations in the 
information of those questioned. 
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IV		The	range	of	expressions,	captioned	by	‘Predicates	of	Personal	Taste’,	that	are	included	within	the	scope	of	the	discussion	of	Chapter	4	of	Relativism	and	Monadic	Truth	is	pretty	broad.	 It	 includes,	 for	 instance,	 “spicy”,	 “funny”,	 “disgusting”,	 “fun”,	 “nauseating”	 and	“delicious”.		However	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	lead	off	with	a	discussion	of	a	predicate,	“filling”,	as	it	features	in	e.g.,	“This	pasta	is	very	filling”,	that	they	recognize	might	seem	less	 than	 paradigmatic	 of	 the	 ilk.	 They	 do	 so	 because	 “a	 number	 of	 the	 key	 relevant	distinctions	can	be	made,	with	minimal	distraction,	using	that	predicate.”	(p.102)	Their	aim	 is	 that	 “of	 producing	 the	 bare	 bones	 of	 a	 contextualist	 story	 about	 the	 truth	conditions	 of	 claims	 in	 which	 that	 predicate	 figures.”	 The	 general	 tendency	 of	 the	chapter	is	to	build	on	this	to	argue	that,	and	illustrate	how,	a	contextualism	of	the	same	broad	 stripe	 can,	 in	 almost	 all	 instances,	 both	 explain	 away	 the	 appearances	 of	contradiction	 or	 disagreement	 in	 cases	 where	 we	 intuitively	 feel	 they	 should	 be	explained	away	and	sustain	such	appearances,	in	cases	where	they	should	be	sustained,	without	recourse	to	relativistic	manoeuvres.		 The	“bare	bones”	contextualist	semantics	is	glossed	as	follows	(p.	103):		 	.	 .	 .	on	an	occasion	of	use,	a	predication	of	 'filling'	 to	some	 item	will	 tacitly	 relate	 that	item	to	a	particular	individual	or	group.	In	the	simplest	case,	a	claim	of	the	form	‘That	is	filling’,	as	made	by	X,	where	‘that’	refers	to	Y,	will	express	the	proposition	that	Y	is	filling	for	X	(where	the	truth	conditions	turn	on	how	X	is	disposed	with	regard	to	Y).	Obviously	 any	 such	 account	 will	 provide	 the	 resources	 to	 disarm	 any	 suggestion	 of	contradiction	 in	 the	 simple	 kind	 of	 case	 illustrated	 e.g.	 by	 a	 ballerina’s	 saying	 of	 a	serving	 of	 leek	 and	 potato	 soup	 that	 “This	 is	 rather	 filling.	 I	 had	 better	 not	 have	 any	more”,	and	the	assertion	of	a	sumo	wrestler,	of	a	similar-sized	portion,	that	“This	isn’t	filling	enough;	I	am	going	to	need	several	portions	at	this	rate.”	That	is	a	good	result	if	it	is	 taken	as	obvious	 that	 the	ballerina	and	the	wrestler	are	not	really	 in	disagreement,	which	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	assume	is	so.22			 Included	 among	 the	 “key	 relevant	 distinctions”	 that	 uses	 of	 “filling”	 serve	 to	illustrate	 is	 that	between	autocentric	and	exocentric	uses:	 in	 the	 former,	 the	operative	perspective	is	that	of	the	speaker	or	a	group	which	the	speaker	belongs;	in	the	latter	it	is	that	of	a	third	party	or	group	to	which	the	speaker	does	not	belong.	Thus	someone	may	say,	menu	in	hand,	“The	leek	and	potato	soup	won’t	be	very	filling;	I	am	going	to	have	a	main	course	as	well”,	and	then	on	another	occasion	in	the	same	restaurant,	advising	his	small	daughter	what	to	order,	“Be	careful:	the	leek	and	potato	soup	will	be	filling”.		Here,	very	 plausibly,	 there	 is	 no	 serious	 question	 of	 inconsistency,	 or	 change	 of	 mind,	expressed	by	the	two	utterances;	and	a	similarly	explicable	illusion	operates,	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	 are	 suggesting,	 in	 some	 of	 the	 apparent	 ‘disagreements’	 of	 taste	 that	provide	impetus	to	relativism.		 Well	and	good.	But	of	course	no	relativist	about	 taste	ought	 to	want	 to	maintain	that	 all	 apparent	 disagreements	 involving	 judgements	 of	 taste	 are	 genuine	disagreements	 in	 the	 sense	of	T5,	 strongly	 interpreted.	Relativists	 are	 free	 to	 take	on	board	 the	 distinction	 between	 autocentric	 and	 exocentric	 uses	 of	 taste	 predicates—indeed	to	write	this	 into	the	account	of	how	contexts	of	assessment	can	vary—nor	do	they	have	any	interest	in	denying	that	there	are	some	uses	of	taste	predicates	in	which	speakers	 effectively	 do	 talk	merely	 about	 their	 own	 propensities.	 The	 charge	will	 be,	though,	that	these	considerations	fall	well	short	of	the	means	to	disarm	an	appearance																																																									
22 For the record, one of the present authors didn’t find that obvious at all. 
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of	genuine	disagreement	in	all	cases.	Indeed,	one	can	foresee	one	reason	why	they	may	fail	 to	 do	 so	 in	 a	 point	 of	 disanalogy	 between	 “filling”	 and	 other,	more	 paradigmatic	predicates	of	personal	taste	on	which	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	themselves	remark	on	at	the	outset	of	their	discussion	(p.	99)	but	make	nothing	of.	“Filling”,	for	the	purposes	of	 their	discussion,	 is	 treated	as	ascribing	a	disposition	 to	 induce	a	 certain	distinctive	complex	of	 sensations	when	 ingested.	 It	 does	not	 express	 any	kind	of	 evaluation.	But	“funny”,	 “disgusting”,	 “fun”,	 and	 “delicious”,	 (though	 probably	 not	 “spicy”,	 and	“nauseating”	only	in	some	uses)	are	predicates	of	value:	in	applying	them	in	a	particular	case	 one	 places	 value,	 positive	 or	 negative,	 on	 the	 object,	 activity,	 or	 performance	 to	which	 they	are	applied.	 If	one	adds	 to	 that	point	 the	 thought—to	be	sure,	 it	 is	not	an	immediate	 consequence—that	 in	 expressing	 a	 certain	 evaluation	 of	 something,	 one	thereby	presents	it	as	a	fitting	evaluation	and	represents	the	object,	etc.,	as	suitable	for	it,	then	one	can	see	how	paradigmatic	predicates	of	personal	taste	may	be	at	the	service	of	 claims	 that	 are	 in	 a	 crucial	 respect	 more	 adventurous	 than	 mere	 ascriptions	 of	dispositions	 to	 induce	 certain	 kinds	 of	 affect	 and	 for	 that	 reason	 potentially	 more	controversial	 and	 answerable	 to	 an	 additional	 range	 of	 potentially	 defeating	considerations.			 Depending	 on	 the	 specific	 predicate	 concerned,	 ‘suitability’	 for	 a	 certain	evaluation	 may	 cover	 a	 range	 of	 possible	 cases:	 the	 object,	 etc.	 may	 be	 being	represented	as	such	that	it	ought	to	be	accorded	the	value	in	question,	or	deserves	to	be	accorded	 the	 value	 in	 question,	 can	 at	 least	 appropriately	 be	 accorded	 the	 value	 in	question,	 or	 can	 defensibly	 be	 accorded	 the	 value	 in	 question,	 or	 can	 intelligibly	 be	accorded	the	value	 in	question	 .	 .	 .	and	these,	even	the	 last,	are	all,	 in	particular	cases,	debatable	and	potentially	controversial.	Clearly	there	 is	ample	scope	for	a	much	more	fine-grained	exploration	of	these	nuances	of	predications	of	personal	taste	than	we	have	space	 to	 attempt	 here.	 The	 present	 point	 is	 only	 that,	 by	 lumping	 dispositional	predicates	like	“filling”	along	with	the	other	usual	suspects	as	all	“predicates	of	personal	taste”,	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 encourage	 neglect	 of	 one	 potential	 reason	 why	 one	might	expect	that	some	members	of	the	group	are	more	likely	to	service	the	expression	of	genuine	disagreements	than	others.		 The	ballerina/wrestler	and	father/daughter	examples	illustrate	two	kinds	of	case	where	a	 contextualist	 semantics	of	 the	kind	prefigured	will—quite	 correctly,	 as	many	will	 feel—explain	away	any	appearance	of	contradiction.	 	But	there	are	other	kinds	of	case,	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	emphasise,	where,	consistently	with	contextualism,	the	appearance	 of	 contradiction	 is	 saved	 and	 genuine	 disagreement	 occurs.	What	doesn’t	occur,	in	their	view,	is	faultless	disagreement.	Rather,	there	is	a	kind	of	see-saw:	if,	when	further	detail	is	specified,	the	appearance	of	disagreement	is	sustained,	the	impression	of	 faultlessness	 will	 be	 a	 casualty;	 and	 conversely,	 insofar	 as	 the	 impression	 of	faultlessness	persists,	the	appearance	of	genuine	disagreement	will	weaken.23		 In	what	kinds	of	case	can	genuine	disagreement	be	identified	consistently	with	a	contextualist	 semantics?24	 Suppose	Herman	has	 an	 invitation	 to	 the	Warden’s	 garden	party.	“I'm	going	to	go.	It	will	be	good	fun”,	he	says.	“Indeed	it	won’t”,	rejoins	John.	Three	possible	cases	are:	
																																																								
23 Cappelen and Hawthorne are quite explicit on this. They write: “Disagreement intuitions subside as ‘no-fault’ 
intuitions gain ground.” (p.120) and later on they claim “Cases where the sense of no fault runs deep are ones 
where the sense of disagreement runs shallow.” (p.132). 
24 See their discussion on pp.110-1.  
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(1)	Herman	is	using	‘fun’	autocentrically	and	John	is	using	it	exocentrically	to	point	out	that	the	party	will	not	be	fun	for	Herman—he	imputes	to	Herman	a	mistake	in	thinking	that	the	party	will	be	fun	for	him,	believing	that	when	he	gets	there,	he	will	rapidly	feel	like	a	fish	out	of	water.	(2)	Herman’s	intention	is	to	claim	that	the	party	will	be	fun	for	a	certain	group	of	friends	and	colleagues	who	will	be	there.	John	corrects	him	by	pointing	out	that	the	party	will	not	be	fun	for	him,	i.e.	John	(who	belongs	to	that	group.)		(3)	Herman,	in	claiming	that	the	party	will	be	fun,	merely	intends	the	claim	to	apply	to	himself	alone,	but	John	misunderstands	him,	thinking	he’s	claiming	that	it	will	be	fun	for	both	Herman	and	himself,	and	is	confident	that	he—John—would	hate	it	 if	he	were	to	go.	These	illustrate	the	seesaw.	In	cases	(1)	and	(2),	there	is	genuine	disagreement,	but	no	faultlessness—Herman	is	mistaken	in	case	(2)	and,	let’s	suppose,	in	case	(1)	as	well.	In	case	 (3),	 there	 is	 the	 same	 appearance	 of	 disagreement	 (we	 are	 supposing	 that	 the	dialogue	proceeds	 in	exactly	 the	same	 form	 in	all	 three	cases)	but	 this	 time	 there	 is	a	misunderstanding,	with	the	result	that	neither	Herman	nor	John	need	be	wrong,	but	nor	are	they	contradicting	each	other.		 Very	well.	But	what	about	(4)	Both	Herman	and	John	are	speaking	autocentrically?	This	 is	 the	 case	 intendedly	 illustrated	 by	 Greta’s	 and	 Elisabeth’s	 exchange	 about	 the	sushi,	 and	 the	 dialogue	with	 the	 talking	 vulture.	 And	 so	 far	 as	we	 have	 been	 able	 to	determine,	all	 that	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	have	 to	offer	about	 it,	 in	 the	end,	 is	 that,	insofar	as	people	do	have	a	sense	of	disagreement	or	contradiction	in	such	cases—and	they	do	not	deny	that	many	people	may—they	are	confused	about	the	content	of	what	is	being	said.	The	correct	model	is	supplied,	rather,	by	the	ballerina/wrestler	examples.		 The	playing	of	this	"semantic	blindness"	card	is	of	course	a	familiar	contextualist	move	in	other	contexts,	notably	in	the	debates	concerning	contextualism	about	“knows”.	We	 have	 no	 space	 here	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 methodological	 issues	 it	 raises,	 except	 to	remind	 the	 reader	 that	 we	 are	 here	 dealing	 with	 proposals	 for	 descriptive	 semantic	theory,	and	 that	 it	 is	 therefore	prospectively	a	critical	weakness	 in	such	 theory	 if	 it	 is	forced	 to	 pooh-pooh	 the	 data	 of	 which	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 giving	 a	 theoretical	reconstruction.25	 The	 case	 for	 relativism,	 diagnosed	 as	 earlier,	 rests	 crucially	 on	 the	impression	 that	 there	 is	 genuine	 disagreement	 in	 such	 cases,	 focused	 on	 a	 shared	content—that	 there	 is	 no	 “talking	 past”	 going	 on.	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 seem	prepared	 in	 the	 end—once	 their	 repertoire	 of	 contextualism-friendly	 cases	 is	exhausted—simply	 to	 insist	 otherwise.	 But	 the	 fact	 doesn’t	 go	 away	 that	 it	 seems	absolutely	 natural	 to	 report	 that	 e.g.	 "Greta	 and	 Elisabeth	 completely	 disagree	 about	whether	 the	sushi	 is	awful”—in	a	way	 that,	 for	example,	 it	would	be	highly	unnatural	and	misleading	to	report	that	“Paul	and	Tamsin	disagree	about	whether	Ottie	is	ready”,	when	Paul	is	talking	about	Ottie’s	upcoming	grade	six	piano	exam	and	Tamsin	is	talking	about	 her	 state	 of	 dress	 for	 the	 party.	 The	 issue	 is	 an	 empirical	 one	 but	 we	 do	 not	believe	 that	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 have	 much	 support	 from	 ordinary	 speakers’	‘intuitions’	or	‘senses’	about	the	kind	of	cases	where	the	relativist	will	complain	of	lost	disagreement.	In	particular,	we	reject	the	idea	that	ordinary	speakers’	‘intuition’	would																																																									
25 For an excellent discussion of the issues here, see Baker 2012. 
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dismiss	 the	sushi	case	as	one	of	genuine	disagreement	on	 the	grounds	 that	Greta	and	Elisabeth	are	really	just	obliquely	talking	about	their	own	personal	tastes,	though	they	are,	of	course,	expressing	their	own	tastes,	and	they	may—a	point	we	are	about	to	come	on	to—retreat	to	talking	about	their	own	personal	tastes.			 But	we	are	spinning	our	wheels,	rather.	Again,	how	is	shared	content,	or	the	lack	of	 it,	 to	be	argued	 for?	Maybe	 the	Forked	Tongue	 test	 gives	us	 some	purchase	on	 the	matter.	We	will	suggest,	though,	a	different	way	past	the	threatening	impasse.			V		There	is,	in	ordinary	discourse,	a	distinction	in	use	between	what	we	shall	here	dub	the	
objectifying	idiom	exemplified	by	“This	sushi	is	delicious”	and	“The	party	is	going	to	be	fun”	and	the	corresponding	subjective-relational	reports:	“I	find	this	sushi	delicious”,	or	“This	sushi	tastes	delicious	to	me”,	and	“I'm	going	to	enjoy	the	party”	or	“The	party	will	be	fun	for	me.”	Moreover	it	appears	that	the	objectifying	claims	are	in	general	treated	as	somehow	 stronger;	 witness	 that,	 in	 a	 wide	 class	 of	 contexts,	 a	 subjective-relational	claim	 provides	 a	 fall-back	 when	 an	 objectifying	 statement	 runs	 into	 difficulty.	 Greta	asserts,	 “The	 sushi	 is	 delicious”	 but	 then	 finds	 that	 all	 her	 dining	 companions	 are	expressing	regret	at	ordering	it	and	falls	back	to,	“Well,	I	am	enjoying	it	at	any	rate.”			 A	 naïve	 realism	has	 no	 difficulty	with	 this:	 for	 the	 naïve	 realist,	 the	 objectifying	claims	purport	to	record	the	taste	facts;	and	the	relational	claims	describe	characteristic	responses	by	the	speaker	which	may	or	may	not	indicate	the	obtaining	of	the	relevant	fact.	But	how	is	this	pattern	to	be	accounted	for	if	not	as	by	naïve	realism?	Relativism,	too,	 can	 take	 the	 point	 in	 stride.	 For	 relativism,	 the	 objectifying	 claim,	 unlike	(presumably)	 the	 corresponding	 subjective-relational	 reports,	 will	 be	 true,	 or	 not,	 as	assessed	 in	 a	 particular	 context	 and	 so	 may	 match	 the	 latter	 in	 truth-value	 when	originally	asserted	but	cease	to	do	so	when	assessed	from	a	later	standpoint	when	some	material	 change	 in	 the	 parameters	 of	 assessment	 has	 taken	 place.	 However,	contextualism	has	 little	 option	but	 to	 try	 to	 identify	 some	more	 adventurous	but	 still	relational	claim	than	the	original	subjective-relational	report	and	make	a	case	that	it	is	generally	this	stronger	claim	that	is	put	forward	by	one	who	speaks	in	the	objectifying	mode.	A	move	in	that	direction,	of	course,	immediately	blocks	the	suggestion	that	in	the	autocentric-autocentric	 type	 of	 case,	 expressed	 in	 objectifying	 idiom,	 the	 antagonists	are	 merely	 obliquely	 talking	 about	 their	 own	 individual	 affective	 states	 and	 thus	“talking	 past”	 each	 other.	 It	 thus	 obviates	 any	 immediate	 need	 for	 manoeuvres	 with	“semantic	blindness”.26	Indeed,	to	be	fair	to	them,	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	do	dismiss	any	simple-minded	version	of	contextualism	that	finds	no	difference	in	truth-conditions	between	“This	sushi	is	delicious”,	in	the	mouth	of	a	speaker,	S,	and	an	utterance	at	the	same	time	of	 “This	Sushi	 tastes	delicious	 to	S”.27	Still,	 it	merits	emphasis	 that,	beyond																																																									
26 One suspects, though, that in one way or another, contextualists of any sophistication will have to play the 
semantic-blindness card sooner or later: in general, presuppositional accounts may save the appearance of 
conflict in the superficial dynamics of an exchange but once it’s clear that the presupposition has failed, they 
have no choice but to say that the protagonists were talking past each other all along without realising it. 
27 In discussing the problem of ‘lost disagreement’ (pp.124-6) Cappelen and Hawthorne accuse the relativists of 
being “guilty of an all-too naïve understanding of how the predicate ‘spicy’ works [and thus of attacking] a 
simplistic version of contextualism that no contextualist worth his salt ought to be defending”. However, they 
do not say much about how contextualism about taste predicates should be understood. The only qualification 
they add is the following: “When one says something of the form ‘X is spicy’, one transcends the question of 
whether it is spicy to oneself, and the contextualist will recognize this. […] When one uses ‘spicy’, one realizes 
that there are public standards on its application and realizes that, whether a meal tastes spicy to oneself does not 
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the	provisional	reference	 to	“a	group”	 featuring	 in	 the	bare-bones	rubric	cited	earlier,	they	offer	nothing	by	way	of	a	more	definite,	less	simple-minded	proposal.	Indeed,	the	constructive	part	of	Chapter	4	concludes	on	a	very	downbeat	note	about	the	prospects	of	saying	anything	much	that	is	clear	and	definite	(pp.120-1):		“A	 confession	 is	 in	 order,	 however.	 Suppose	 one	 emerges	 from	 one's	 Pyrrhonian	reflections	with	no	powerful	 relativist	 axe	 to	 grind.	 Still,	 there	 is	 no	 easy	 recipe	 for	 the	right	contextualist	 semantics.	The	distinction	between	cases	wherein	one	of	 two	parties	has	a	distorted	verdict	from	cases	where	two	parties	speak	past	one	another	is	vague	and	confusing.	We	do	not	pretend	otherwise.”	The	 reader	 may	 understandably	 feel	 short-changed	 by	 this	 anti-climactic	 admission.	Surely	 if	 contextualism	 does	 have	 the	 resources	 for	 an	 intellectually	 more	 satisfying	response	to	the	original	problematic	than	naïve	realism,	expressivism	or	relativism	can	provide,	we	are	owed	a	much	more	concrete	indication	of	how	a	contextualist	semantics	for	predicates	of	personal	taste	should	run.		 Let’s	 try	 to	 see	 how	 what	 Cappelen	 and	 Hawthorne	 offer	 might	 possibly	 be	improved.	It	is	natural	to	ask:	what	does	an	objectifying	judgement—an	O-statement—add	 to	 an	 associated	 subjective-relational	 (explicitly	 autocentric)	 report—an	 S-R	
statement?	 But	 let's	 first	 ask	 a	 slightly	 less	 loaded	 question:	 what	 are	 the	 salient	connections	and	contrasts	in	use	between	the	two	types	of	claim?		 We	have	already	noted	two.	First,	S-R	statements	often	provide	a	fall-back	in	cases	where	a	corresponding	O-statement	emerges	as	inappropriate,	or	defeated.	“This	ride	is	terrific	fun!”	says	John	to	his	companions	on	the	Coney	Island	Cyclone	but	then,	noticing	their	frozen,	grey-faced	expressions,	retreats	to	“Well,	 I	am	enjoying	it,	anyway.”	More	generally,	 S-R	 statements	 characteristically	 express	 an	 assertibility-condition	 for	 a	corresponding	 O-statement:	 the	 O-statement	 may	 be	 asserted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 one’s	recognising	in	oneself	an	affect	or	response	(an	S-R	response)	that	would	verify	the	S-R	statement.	Simple	contextualism	explains	this	by	identifying	the	two	statements’	truth-conditions.	But	any	such	proposal	bumps	up	against	the	fact	that	they	generally	diverge	in	their	conditions	of	withdrawal	or	denial—their	defeaters.	A	less	simple	contextualism	that	enlarges	the	relevant	‘group’	may	perhaps	accommodate	the	divergence.	That	will	depend	on,	inter	alia,	the	detail	of	the	admissible	defeaters,	on	which	more	in	a	minute.	Note,	though,	that	a	familiar	potential	difficulty	for	group-style	contextualist	proposals	opens	at	that	point.	If	the	truth-conditions	for	the	O-statement	involve	the	reactions	of	a	group,	that	commits	the	assertion	of	it	to	a	certain	ambition:	a	speaker	who	bases	that	assertion	 on	 her	 own	 affect,	 or	 response	 as	 described	 in	 the	 corresponding	 S-R	statement	 is	 then	asserting	 that	 her	 reaction,	 or	 something	 relevantly	 similar,	will	 be	shared	across	the	relevant	group.	That	opens	up	a	risk	of	irresponsibility	if	the	speaker	has	given	little	thought	to	what	might	constitute	the	relevant	group	or	is	unclear	about	its	membership	or	 lacks	reason	to	think	that	her	reaction	will	be	shared	across	 it.	We	suggest,	although	the	issue	is	again	an	empirical	one,	that	ordinary	speakers	habitually	do	speak	 in	 the	objectifying	mode	purely	on	 the	basis	of	 their	own	reactions,	without	any	clear	intention	about	a	relevant	group	or	evidence	that	their	reactions	are	typical.	If	that	is	true,	it	is	a	point	against	‘sophisticated’	contextualism.	We’ll	come	back	to	it	in	a	moment.		 The	 second	 point	 of	 contrast	 noted	 earlier	 is	 that	 O-statements	 often	 carry	 a	normative	 payload	 (of	 the	 target’s	 deserving	 or	 being	 suitable	 for,	 etc.,	 the	 relevant																																																																																																																																																																													
settle the question” (124-5). But this, of course, does not help much in clarifying how the contextualist thesis 
should be properly understood. We are about to press this point in the main text. 
		
14	
subjective	affect)	which	a	corresponding	S-R	statement	lacks.	One	can	find	things	funny	which	additional	 information	may	cause	one	 to	reckon	are	not	 funny	at	all,	and	when	that	 happens,	 the	 characteristic	 effect	 of	 the	 additional	 information	 is	 to	 call	 into	question	the	fittingness	of	one’s	original	response.	One’s	natural	sense	of	humour	may	also	be	overridden	by	moral	considerations.	Children	have	 to	 learn	not	only	 that	 they	shouldn’t	laugh	at	certain	kinds	of	thing	but	also	that	they	shouldn’t	find	them	funny	in	the	first	place.			 Does	 e.g.	 “delicious”	 pattern	 with	 “funny”	 in	 that	 respect?	 It	 is	 a	 nice	 question.	Information	about	how	pâté	de	foie	gras	is	produced	may	properly	disincline	one	ever	to	eat	it—even	perhaps	to	campaign	against	the	cruelty	involved	in	its	production.	But	it	is	not	clear	that	it	should	tend	to	defeat	the	claim	that	it	is	delicious,	or	to	show	that	one	shouldn’t	find	it	delicious	if	one	eats	it.	Mindful	that	different	taste	predicates	may	differ	in	 subtle	 such	 respects,	 and	 making	 no	 claim	 to	 comprehensiveness,	 we	 can	nevertheless	propose	a	provisional	taxonomy	of	potential	defeaters	for	O-statements	of	taste	that,	crucially,	are	not	also	defeaters	for	corresponding	S-R	statements.	 It	should	include	at	least	the	following:		 a)	 Stability:	 Lack	 of	 stability	 in	 one’s	 subjective	 reactions	 across	 a	 relevantly	similar	range	of	cases	may	defeat	an	O-statement.	More	specifically,	 it	may	undermine	the	 status	 of	 one’s	 S-R	 response	 as	 warranting	 the	 assertion	 of	 the	 O-statement.	Sometimes,	 let’s	 suppose,	you	enjoy	playing	a	not-too-serious	game	of	Bridge	and	 the	“craic”	 over	 the	 cards;	 other	 times—it’s	 not	 clear	why—you	 cannot	 get	 involved	 and	quickly	get	bored.	Mindful	of	this,	you	can	truly	report,	on	an	appropriate	occasion,	that	“I	am	enjoying	the	cards	tonight”,	but	should	not	assert,	“Bridge	is	fun.”28		 b)	Community:		A	substantial	lack	of	agreement	often	functions	as	a	defeater	for	an	O-statement—recall	 John’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 dismay	 of	 his	 companions	 on	 the	rollercoaster,	and	Greta’s	to	her	dinner	companions’	reaction	to	the	sushi.		 c)	Robustness:	One’s	subjective	response	may	be	widely	shared	yet	till	defeated	as	a	 ground	 for	 an	 O-statement	 by	 relations	 of	 subordination	 among	 different	 kinds	 of	values.	The	comic	magician	Tommy	Cooper’s	slithering	down	the	stage	curtain	during	a	trick	got	a	laugh	from	most	of	the	audience	until	they	realised	that	it	wasn’t	part	of	his	act	 but	 signalled	 that	 he	 was	 unwell—actually,	 suffering	 a	 fatal	 heart	 attack.	 More	generally,	statements	about	what	is	funny,	and	also	about	what	is	fun,	are	defeasible	by	moral	 considerations	 about	 hurt	 and	 harm.	 Conversely,	 an	 O-statement	 of	 disgust	prompted	 by,	 say,	 witnessing	 a	 birth	may	 be	 defeated	 by	 considerations	 of	 its	 sheer	biological	normality	and	the	value	of	the	end	product,	a	new	human	life	brought	into	the	world.		 d)	Typicality:	Certain	physical	or	psychological	conditions—for	instance,	intake	of	laughing	 gas	 or	 alcohol,	 bipolar	mental	 illness,	 residues	 of	 strong	 toothpaste	 or	 blue	cheese	 in	 one's	 mouth,	 depression,	 or	 the	 side-effects	 on	 one’s	 taste	 buds	 of	 recent	chemotherapy—are	standardly	treated	as	dependable	sources	of	distortion,	inhibition,	or	exaggeration	of	a	relevant	range	of	S-R	responses	and	consequently	as	disqualifying	them	as	grounds	for	a	normally	associated	type	of	O-statement.		 Now,	 it	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 grant	 that	 considerations	 in	 these	 four	 categories	 are	potential	defeaters	of	O-statements	in	circumstances	where	a	suitable	S-R	statement	is	true,	 i.e.	 that	 they	 disqualify	 the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 otherwise	 appropriate	 subjective	response	 as	 a	 ground	 for	 the	 assertion.	 It	 is	 another	 thing	 to	 assume	 that	 they	 do	 so																																																									
28 We here breach our self-imposed restriction (see n. 13 above) to avoid generic, or apparently generic, 
examples. 
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because	they	tend	to	override,	or	undermine,	the	status	of	that	response	as	evidence	for	the	obtaining	of	a	state	of	affairs	that	would	make	the	O-statement	true.	However	if,	like	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne,	we	are	approaching	these	matters	in	the	spirit	of	Simplicity,	it	is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	 disparities	 in	 the	 respective	 uses	 of	 O-statements	 and	 S-R	 statements	 except	 by	 associating	 them	 with	 appropriately	contrasting	non-relativistic	 truth-conditions	and	postulating	an	appropriate	evidential	relationship	 between	 them.	 The	 required	 kind	 of	 truth-conditions	 for	 an	O-statement	will	have	to	be	such	that	each	of	the	admitted	kinds	of	defeater	will	spoil	the	evidence	for	their	satisfaction	that	would	otherwise	be	provided	by	an	appropriate	S-R	response.	And	at	this	point,	 the	move	towards	something	not	too	distant	from,	though	enlarging	upon,	the	kind	of	contextualism	at	which	Cappelen	and	Hawthorne	casually	gesture	may	seem	 inevitable.	 The	 O-statement	 will	 be	 a	 claim	 whose	 truth	 requires	 dependable	(Stability)	 shared	S-R	responses	of	an	appropriate	kind	across	a	contextually	 relevant	group	 (Community)	 under	 normal	 circumstances	 (Typicality),	 and	 the	 evaluation	 it	expresses	must	 be	 resilient	 in	 the	 light	 of	 other,	 superordinate	 values	 of	 the	 group29	(Robustness).	There	will	accordingly	be	scope	for	contextual	determination,	in	the	light,	presumably	of	the	intentions	of	the	speaker,	both	of	the	population	of	the	group	and	of	the	range	of	circumstances	wherein	the	relevant	kind	of	S-R	response	is	germane.			 So,	why	 be	 uncomfortable	with	 a	 contextualist	 proposal	 along	 these	 lines?	 Two	principal,	related	concerns	are	salient.	One	is	the	resultant	rarefaction	of	the	conditions	for	genuine	disagreements	expressed	using	O-statements.	Greta	and	Elisabeth	respond	in	 their	 different	 ways	 to	 the	 sushi	 and	 go	 straight	 into	 what	 they	 take	 to	 be	 a	disagreement,	 based	 just	 on	 their	 own	 reactions.	But	 if	 the	 sketched	 contextualism	 is	correct,	the	conditions	for	there	to	be	a	genuine	incompatibility	in	their	claims	are	quite	demanding,	 involving	overlap	of	 their	 intentions	about	 a	number	of	matters	 to	which	they	are	very	 likely	giving	no	 thought.	 	 Competent	 speakers	are	not	usually	 so	 casual	about	 identifying	 themselves	 as	 in	 disagreement	 where	 context-sensitive	 language	 is	involved.	But	the	second	concern,	already	noted	earlier,	is	perhaps	the	more	serious.		It	is	that	the	ground	for	an	O-statement	provided	by	an	appropriate	S-R	response,	which	ought	to	be	canonical,	now	begins	to	look	suspiciously	slight.	I	 laugh	at	a	joke	and	say,	“That’s	funny”.	But	if	the	kind	of	contextualist	account	gestured	at	is	correct,	ought	I	not	first	to	settle	on	a	constituency	for	my	remark,	to	get	some	evidence	of	the	response	to	the	joke	among	other	members,	to	think	about	possibly	off-colour	moral	ramifications	of	the	jest,	and	so	on?			 Remember,	 however,	 that	 the	 drive	 to	 a	 contextualism	 on	 this	 broad	 model	 is	driven	by	an	assumption:	that	both	the	evidential	connection	and	the	disparities	in	use	between	O-statements	and	corresponding	S-R	statements	need	to	be	recovered	from	the	
relations	between	their	respective	truth-conditions,	between	the	kinds	of	states	of	affairs	that	are	apt	 to	make	them,	respectively,	 true.	This	assumption	 is	non-compulsory.	We	can,	and	should,	drop	the	idea	that	assertoric	content	has	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	truth-conditional	 content	 as	 implicitly	 interpreted	 by	 Simplicity.	 To	 be	 sure,	 assertoric	content	does	go	hand	in	hand	with	amenability	to	a	disquotational	truth	predicate	but	it	is	 a	 further	 step	 to	 take	 this	 to	 be	 content	 fit	 for	 the	 representation	 of	 real-worldly	states	of	affairs.	The	discrepancies	 in	the	conditions	of	defeat	of	O-statements	and	S-R	statements	do	not	and,	we	contend,	should	not	be	 taken	as	demanding	explanation	of	the	kind	that	the	contextualism	adumbrated	above	implicitly	attempts.	
																																																								
29 —or maybe: values which the group ought to have. 
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	 This	 is	 not	 the	 occasion	 to	 embark	 on	 a	 full	 development	 of	 the	 minimalist	alternative.	But	in	barest	outline,	the	question	to	ask,	we	propose,	 is	not:	what	kind	of	fact	must	O-statements	be	taken	to	describe	if	both	their	assertibility	on	the	basis	of	an	appropriate	S-R	response	and	their	conditions	of	defeasibility	adumbrated	above	are	to	be	 explained,	 but:	 what	 point	 would	 the	 institution	 of	 such	 assertions	 serve—why	would	 it	 be	 worthwhile	 having	 a	 practice	 wherein	 such	 statements	 were	 treated	 as	assertible	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 S-R	 responses	 but	 defeasible	 under	 the	 kinds	 of	 conditions	reviewed?	And	here	is	where	it	helps	to	be	mindful	that	in	core	cases	of	O-statements	of	personal	 taste,	we	are	dealing	with	 expressions	of	value:	 of	 things	 to	 cherish,	 pursue,	discourage	and	avoid.	Not	all	values	are	things	that	everybody	cares	about.	Amorality,	ecological	indifference	and	philistinism	are,	in	varying	degrees,	not	unusual.	But	values	of	personal	taste	are	important	to	everybody.	And	we	care	because	the	S-R	responses	on	which	they	are	grounded	are	absolutely	integral	to	our	humanity	and	our	engagement	with	life.	A	world	in	which	we	found	nothing	funny,	or	fun,	or	delicious,	or	exciting,	or	attractive,	.	.	,	would	be	a	world	in	which	it	was	not	worth	living.	And	a	world	in	which	our	 lives	 were	 dominated	 by	 negative	 S-R	 responses—of	 disgust,	 distaste,	 boredom,	blandness	and	ugliness—would	be	a	living	hell.			 Focusing	now	on	the	positive	cases,	a	reminder	is	apt	of	a	range	of	mundane	and	contingent	but	very	important	facts	about	these	responses.	First,	in	a	wide	class	of	cases	our	 enjoyment	 of	 values	 of	 taste,	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 associated	 S-R	 responses,	 is	characteristically	 enhanced	 by	 sharing	 and	 socialisation:	 the	 ride	 is	 more	 fun	 when	others	 are	 with	 you	 and	 enjoying	 it	 too;	 we	 like	 to	 eat	 together;	 we—most	 of	 us,	 at	least—prefer	to	go	to	the	theatre	with	friends.	Second,	we	do	naturally	share	many	of	these	responses.		Third,	they	are	also	in	many	cases	to	a	high	degree	tractable—one	can	acquire	 and	 refine	 patterns	 of	 response	 of	 these	 kinds	 by	 experience	 and	 education.	Fourth,	many	of	these	responses	have	a	rich	causal	provenance	in	their	objects,	which	is	receptive	 to	 study,	 technique	and	manufacture—to	 the	arts	of	 cuisine,	 comedy,	dance	and	drama.	Fifth,	we	do	regard	them	as	subject	to	conditions	of	appropriateness	 in	the	light	of	others	of	our	social	and	personal	values.	All	of	these	factors	combine	to	create	a	situation	 where	 we	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 having	 an	 idiom	 that	 enables	 us,	 more	 than	merely	reporting	a	response	we	have,	to	project	 it	as	a	possible	point	of	co-ordination,	something	 which	 may	 be	 shared	 and	 thereby	 enhanced,	 is	 dependable	 rather	 than	ephemeral,	 something	 which	 is	 a	 reaction	 of	 our	 normal,	 healthy	 selves,	 and	 free	 of	taints	 of	 spite,	 schadenfreude,	 cruelty	 or	 other	 morally	 reprehensible	 features,	 and	whose	causal	prompts	it	may	be	worthwhile	understanding	with	a	view	to	developing	an	associated	art.			 We	 are	 not	 of	 course	 suggesting	 that	 ordinary	 speakers	 characteristically	 have	such	considerations	in	mind	in	making	O-statements.	Rather,	even	in	this	whistle-stop	overview,	the	beginnings	can	be	seen	of	how	an	account	might	run	of	the	social	utility	of	an	objectifying	idiom	of	taste	which	both	assigns	the	importance	it	had	better	assign	to	grounding	 in	 personal	 responses	 and	 explains	 the	 broad	 range	 of	 defeaters	 we	 have	noted	without	any	need	to	reconceive	 the	content	of	O-statements	along	contextualist	lines	or	to	query	appearances	of	disagreement	where	ordinary	speakers	take	it	to	occur.	This	 minimalist	 approach	 shares	 with	 expressivism	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 in	making	such	statements,	we	are	normally	 in	the	business	of	trying	to	report	the	facts;	but	 its	 expressivism	 is	 advanced	 as	 a	 thesis	 of	 pragmatics,	 not	 a	 claim	 about	 the	semantics	of	the	statements	in	question.	And	it	agrees	with	relativism	both	in	accepting	that	 basic	disagreements	 about	 taste	 are	 just	 that—disagreements	 focused	on	 exactly	the	shared	propositional	content	that	they	seem	to	concern—and	in	rejecting	the	idea	
		
17	
that	in	asserting	or	denying	such	a	content,	one	purports	to	represent	an	objective	fact;	but	 this	 anti-realism	 is	 accomplished	without	 any	 need	 for	 relativistic	manoeuvrings	with	the	truth	predicate.			 It	 has	 been,	 in	 our	 view,	 a	 major	 weakness	 not	 just	 of	 Relativism	 and	 Monadic	
Truth	but	of	almost	all	the	recent	and	contemporary	writing	about	these	issues	that	this	minimalist,	 use-theoretic	 orientation	 has	 been	 invisible	 to	 most	 of	 the	 protagonists,	relativist	 and	 anti-relativist	 alike.	 But	 its	more	 detailed	 and	 positive	 development,	 as	well	as	responses	to	objections,	must	await	another	opportunity.30		
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